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ABSTRACT 
Cyber operations are constantly evolving as states discover new tactics to achieve 
strategic goals. Thus far, they have remained below the threshold for armed conflict by 
operating within the gray zone. Since 2008, Russia has demonstrated a preference for 
using cyber operations with the primary goal to weaken enemies of the state and achieve 
strategic objectives delineated in Russian grand strategy. This thesis examines the 
intersection between Russian cyber operations and grand strategy to weaken NATO. 
Russian grand strategy attempts to strengthen its position as a world power, in part, by 
utilizing cyber operations as a tool to destabilize adversaries. Specifically, their cyber 
operations fundamentally changed the way information is disseminated to sow discord in 
NATO societies, with the ultimate goal of sabotaging elections and democratic processes. 
Russian cyber operations also attempt to destabilize the security of NATO member states 
through cyberattacks against critical infrastructure. Russia’s advances to grow its power 
have put it on a path to directly challenge the regional power balance with itself, NATO, 
and other European states. Russia’s hegemonic goals and threat perceptions of NATO as 
a potential cyber target is a critical development to recognize and respond to present and 
future cyber operations. It is essential that NATO policymakers understand the 
ramifications of these cyber operations in order to preserve NATO security and stability.
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1 
I. RUSSIAN CYBER OPERATIONS:  
AN ENABLER OF GRAND STRATEGY   
A. INTRODUCTION 
Cyberspace is a constantly expanding resource for state and commercial sectors 
that enables increased productivity, connectivity, and more efficient operations. While 
cyberspace is an effective medium to maximize operations it also creates a new opportunity 
for exploitation by adversaries. Of particular interest is the recent increase in the use of 
cyber operations by Russia as an emerging enabler of strategy.1 In order to investigate 
potential threats with regard to cyber operations, this research investigates Russian cyber 
operations and subsequent impacts on state security. Critical to this thesis is the 
identification of Russian grand strategy, previous cyber operations, and reported impacts 
on member states within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This research 
should answer the question: What is the intersection between Russian cyber operations and 
grand strategy to weaken the NATO Alliance?  
Russia utilizes cyber operations as a major component of its information warfare 
strategy. Areas of focus for this research include the manner in which Russia utilizes cyber 
operations and the interconnections of political and strategic goals for the state. The 
purpose of this thesis is to investigate previous Russian cyber operations as it relates to 
possible political influences within the NATO Alliance. The connection between political 
goals and strategic policy is important for analyzing and addressing the strategic purpose 
associated with Russian actions. Historically, priorities for Russia encompass increasing 
economic prosperity, geographical power, military power, and state power. Three main 
tenets of grand strategy that Russia prioritizes are: establishing a greater sphere of influence 
across former territory of the Soviet Union, attaining great power status in the eyes of the 
world, and containing the United States’ (U.S.) and NATO global interests.2  
 
1 Keir Giles, Handbook of Russian Information Warfare, Fellowship Monograph No. 9 (Italy: NATO 
Defense College, 2016). 
2 Robert Person, “Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century” (Presentation, NSI SMA Speaker 
Series, Boston, MA, May 3, 2019), https://nsiteam.com/russian-grand-strategy-in-the-21st-century/. 
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Important for developing a detailed answer to the research question is 
understanding Russian political influence within its grand strategy, defining cyber 
operations within information warfare, and how Russia is utilizing its resources within that 
domain. This research also raises two sub-questions. First, what is the relationship of 
Russian grand strategy to the NATO Alliance? Second, what is the impact of Russian cyber 
operations on the NATO Alliance? In order to answer these sub-questions this research 
analyzes a historical shift of Russian and NATO relations from 2000 to 2020. It also 
reviews Russian political, military, and state leaders’ views on grand strategy in relation to 
NATO. Reviewing Russian strategy, analyzing the scope of cyber operations, and 
identifying case studies provides insight on factors that have shaped and directed Russia’s 
use of cyber operations to attain state goals. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE 
This research is crucial for three reasons. First, it analyzes case studies in order to 
create a greater understanding of Russian reactions to NATO expansion. NATO’s growth 
in the post-Cold War era has placed added strain on its relationship with Russia due to 
NATO’s borders encroaching on Russia. Russia views NATO expansion through a lens of 
containment, and therefore the need to prevent the NATO Alliance from gaining more 
members, as displayed by its strategy and political actions toward the NATO Alliance.3 
Russia utilizes cyber operations to hamper NATO expansion by creating conflict. Russia’s 
advances to grow its power have put it on a path to directly challenge the regional power 
balance among itself, NATO, and other European states. Russia’s hegemonic goals and 
threat perceptions of its European neighbors are critical aspects to know and understand as 
drivers of Russian strategic views.4 
Second, this thesis analyzes Russian aims to capitalize on the lack of political 
cohesion within NATO through attempts to politically fracture the Alliance. Many NATO 
states view political interference as a real threat that Russia poses to their people and 
 
3 Michael Rühle, “NATO Enlargement and Russia: Die-Hard Myths and Real Dilemmas,” NDC 
Research Report (Italy: NATO Defense College, May 15, 2014). 
4 Ibid. 
3 
democratic processes. Russia’s public interference in the democratic processes of elections 
works to undermine the faith of the people in the democratic processes of their state.5 
Russian interference in political events within states undermines each state’s power, 
potentially affecting the power and legitimacy of the Alliance as a whole. Greater member 
coordination within the Alliance that identifies interference operations and ends the 
operations before they can affect the legitimacy of the state will be crucial to countering 
Russian grand strategy and cyber operations. Understanding the political as well as military 
strategic goals of Russian interference is important to developing a coherent strategy within 
the Alliance to counter this threat. 
Third, it analyzes how Russian cyber operations against the civil preparedness of 
NATO diminish the capacity for NATO to respond in a crisis. NATO identifies civil 
preparedness as, “aspects of national planning that affect the ability to contribute to Allied 
efforts in continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and 
civil support to military operations.”6 Civil preparedness is critical to a state’s ability to 
respond after an attack against a member state. NATO identifies resilience as, “society’s 
ability to resist and recover easily and quickly from such shocks [natural disaster, critical 
infrastructure, hybrid or armed attack] and combines civil preparedness with military 
capacity.”7 Cyber operations are capable of targeting and crippling critical infrastructure, 
thus greatly diminishing the ability for a state to respond in crisis. Acknowledging and 
planning, appropriately, for this cyber threat is critical to the security of Alliance states. 
A clear analysis of elements that have led to Russia’s increased use of cyber 
operations within its grand strategy will assist policy, strategy, and military planners within 
NATO in addressing Russian actions. Specifically, this analysis provides potential counter-
strategies to mitigate Russian future cyber operations. This thesis will provide leaders with 
 
5 Geir Hågen Karlsen, “Divide and Rule: Ten Lessons about Russian Political Influence Activities in 
Europe,” Palgrave Communications 5, no. 1 (February 8, 2019): 1–14, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41599-019-
0227-8. 
6 NATO, “Civil Preparedness,” NATO, March 31, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_49158.htm. 
7 NATO, “Resilience and Article 3,” NATO, March 31, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
topics_132722.htm. 
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case studies and research that identify Russian operations at the political and strategic 
levels. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. Russian Grand Strategy 
a. Grand Strategy Defined 
Grand strategy is used repeatedly when states are attempting to understand the 
motivating factors that drive a state to act in the way it does. Andrew Monaghan defines 
grand strategy as, “the art of bringing together and using all the resources of a nation to 
promote the vital interests of the state … It is thus about the relationship between political 
ends and military, economic, political and cultural means—the ‘art of creating power.’”8 
Peter Feaver asserts that grand strategy is, “the collection of plans and policies that 
comprise the state’s deliberate effort to harness political, military, diplomatic, and 
economic tools together to advance that state’s national interest.”9  
Scholars are generally in agreement about the scope of the definition for grand 
strategy. Robert Person briefly defines grand strategy as, “the coordinated and 
comprehensive integration of ways and means to achieve national strategic ends.”10 Colin 
Gray states, “strategy is the bridge that relates military power to political purpose.”11 The 
scope of grand strategy encompasses political and military means as a way of achieving 
the objectives of the state. Grand strategy is long-term focused planning for the role of the 
state years into the future. 
 
8 Andrew Monaghan, “Putin’s Russia: Shaping a ‘Grand Strategy’?,” International Affairs (Royal 
Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 89, no. 5 (2013): 1226–27. 
9 Peter Feaver, “What Is Grand Strategy and Why Do We Need It?,” Foreign Policy, April 8, 2019, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/04/08/what-is-grand-strategy-and-why-do-we-need-it/; Person, “Russian 
Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” May 3, 2019, 2. 
10 Person, “Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” May 3, 2019, 4. 
11 Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17. 
5 
b. History of NATO 
In order to recognize the importance of the NATO-Russian relationship it is 
necessary to analyze the historical purpose of the NATO Alliance. The North Atlantic 
Treaty was signed on April 4, 1949, and within that treaty there are fourteen articles 
defining the duties of each Allied state for collective defense.12 According to NATO, the 
Alliance was founded for the strategic purposes of, “deterring Soviet expansionism, 
forbidding the revival of nationalist militarism in Europe through a strong North American 
presence on the continent, and encouraging European political integration.”13 Of the 
fourteen articles in the treaty, Article 3 and Article 5 are relevant to the security of NATO 
in the cyber domain. NATO Article 3 declares, “the Parties, separately and jointly, by 
means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their 
individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”14 A recent NATO publication 
notes resilience and Article 3 are closely tied in that, “resilience reduces the vulnerability 
of NATO as a whole,” which further strengthens the Alliance’s capacity to respond.15 Tim 
Prior asserts that, “Global connectivity presents new security challenges for NATO, 
especially in relation to critical infrastructure interdependence. Building resilience though 
civil preparedness will be a paradigm changer for deterrence.”16 Prior highlights the 
importance of strong civil preparedness in order to effectively carry out collective defense, 
as stated in Article 5, due to the reliance on a capable critical infrastructure to support 
military operations.17 Article 5 is the article surrounding the principle of collective defense 
which states, “an armed attack against one or more of them… shall be considered an attack 
against them all’ and that following such an attack, each Ally would take ‘such action as it 
 
12 NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty,” NATO, accessed January 28, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm. 
13 NATO, “A Short History of NATO,” NATO, accessed January 28, 2020, http://www.nato.int/cps/
en/natohq/declassified_139339.htm. 
14 NATO, “The North Atlantic Treaty.” 
15 NATO, “Resilience and Article 3.” 
16 Tim Prior, “NATO: Pushing Boundaries for Resilience,” CSS Analyses in Security Policy, no. 213 
(September 2017): 1. 
17 Ibid., 3. 
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deems necessary, including the use of armed force’ in response.”18 Bruno Tertrais notes, 
“Article 5 is meant as an exceptional and temporary measure to deal with military 
threats.”19 Tertrais also acknowledges that Article 5 has worked as a deterrent because 
there has not been any country that has undertaken a large military operation against a 
NATO member.20 Additionally, Article 5 has only been invoked once, which was on 
October 2, 2001 in response to the 9/11 attacks against the United States.21 
Throughout NATO’s formative years, the late 1940s through the 1950s, its priority 
was on defense. NATO history states, “only a truly transatlantic security agreement could 
deter Soviet aggression while simultaneously preventing the revival of European 
militarism and laying the groundwork for political integration.”22 Initially, there was not a 
coordinated military structure within NATO, but the Soviet Union was growing 
militaristically and the Alliance adapted to the growing Soviet threat. This security 
cooperation helped bring about political stability in post-WWII Western Europe. Diego 
Ruiz Palmer notes that NATO began its shift in posture toward “massive retaliation” with 
nuclear capabilities in 1952 in order to counter the Russian atomic bomb threat.23 This 
new approach shifted the collective defense theory toward a nuclear defense and nuclear 
retaliation posture. Ruiz Palmer explains that NATO shifted again from 1957–1967 to a 
“Flexible Response,” or détente, which focused more on conventional defense rather than 
an all or nothing nuclear strike.24 NATO’s goal was to force an arms control agreement 
that would eliminate such weaponry. This did not happen until 1987 when the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty was established between the United States 
 
18 NATO, “A Short History of NATO.” 
19 Bruno Tertrais, “Article 5 of the Washington Treaty: Its Origins, Meaning and Future,” no. 130 
(2016): 2. 
20 Ibid., 4. 
21 Ibid. 
22 NATO, “A Short History of NATO.” 
23 Diego Ruiz Palmer, “A Strategic Odyssey: Constancy of Purpose and Strategy-Making in NATO, 
1949–2019,” NDC Research Paper (Italy: NATO Defense College, June 2019), 28, 
http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1330. 
24 Ibid., 33–34. 
7 
and the Soviet Union. Many experts believed this signaled the end of the Cold War, which 
happened when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989.25 
Following the Cold War and the subsequent break-up of the Soviet Union, NATO 
was left to find its new place in the international order. The Alliance had been founded in 
part to balance against the Soviet threat and had done so for over forty years. During the 
1990s many experts expected NATO to disappear due to the lack of a Soviet threat; 
however, the Alliance survived because it still had two other original missions: “to deter 
the rise of militant nationalism and to provide the foundation of collective security that 
would encourage democritisation and political integration in Europe.”26 John Duffield 
highlights that, due to NATO’s ability to adapt fundamentally, the need for a unified 
response to external threats, and the value of the intra-Alliance ability to cooperate, that 
the Alliance had significant purpose to stay in place.27 Duffield argues that NATO was 
necessary following the end of the Cold War in order to counter any residual military power 
of Russia in order to bring stability to Central and Eastern Europe.28 NATO brought 
increased security to former Soviet states in order to promote the new political reform these 
states were facing following the collapse of the Soviet Union.29 NATO’s shift from 
prioritizing the Soviet threat to taking a proactive stance against external threats abroad 
displayed a fundamental change within the Alliance that was still committed to the security 
of all member states.30 Additionally, NATO views expansion as a tool, “NATO 
enlargement has helped increase stability and prosperity in Europe. It is aimed at promoting 
stability and cooperation, and at building a Europe united in peace, democracy and 
 
25 NATO, “A Short History of NATO.” 
26 NATO. 
27 John S. Duffield, “NATO’s Functions after the Cold War,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 5 
(1994): 766–67, https://doi.org/10.2307/2152531. 
28 Ibid., 768–769. 
29 Ibid., 771. 
30 Ibid. 
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common values.”31 Stability and prosperity are key beliefs of NATO that the Alliance 
wishes to share with other European states.  
c. NATO-Russian Relations—2000 to Today 
Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the new Russian Federation attempted 
to create closer ties to the NATO Alliance to move on from the past. Robert Person 
highlights three distinct phases of Russian grand strategy and relationship with the NATO 
Alliance. He notes that these are “Pragmatic Accommodation” from 2000–2003, “Soft 
Balancing” from 2003–2007, and “Asymmetric Balancing” from 2007-present.32 These 
three phases display the shift of the events that led to increased tensions between NATO 
and Russia. 
In his lecture, Robert Person highlights the key events of the first phase of 
pragmatic accommodation in Russian strategy.33 He notes that the Russian position was 
weak compared to its competitors due to the economic and political recovery the state went 
through during the decade following the collapse of the Soviet Union. He continues on, 
stating that Russian attempts to increase its influence through bargaining and concessions 
in order to secure more Russian interests. One example of this was Russian support of the 
United States following the 9/11 terrorist attack.34 Essentially, Russia gave approval for 
central Asian states to support U.S. intervention in Afghanistan without Russia creating 
issues. In return, Russia expected to secure concessions from the United States to preserve 
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), a treaty the United States withdrew from in 
November of 2001.35 Russia also sought to limit NATO expansion of the Baltic states of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, but NATO also went through with this expansion toward 
 
31 NATO, “NATO Enlargement & Open Door,” NATO, 2017, https://www.nato.int/
nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2017_11/20171130_1711-factsheet-enlargement-eng.pdf. 
32 Person, “Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” May 3, 2019, 11. 
33 Robert Person, Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, Lecture, Future of Global Competition 
& Conflict (NSI SMA Speaker Series, Boston, MA, 2019), https://nsiteam.com/russian-grand-strategy-in-
the-21st-century/. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Person, “Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” May 3, 2019, 12. 
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the Russian border. These events led Russia to abandon pragmatic accommodation for a 
stronger stance to secure the interests of the state.36 
Russia shifted its strategy to focus on soft-balancing in order to achieve its goals. 
Robert Pape states that soft-balancing focuses prioritizes, “to demonstrate resolve in a 
manner that signals a commitment to resist the superpower’s future ambitions” in order to 
set the stage for hard balancing in the future.37 Person asserts that this focus is less 
militaristic and more on the political and diplomatic challenging of adversaries in order to 
slow down a unipolar country.38 Person believes that this strategy is meant to slow down 
a larger state to prevent them from efficiently carrying out tasks that are in the interests of 
that state.39 This phase ended when Russia took a harder stance against its adversaries and 
carried out a cyberattack against Estonia in 2007.40 
The third phase of asymmetric balancing started in 2007 and is still ongoing with 
distinct shifts of Russian use of power to be more assertive and directed. Person defines 
asymmetric balancing tactics as “efforts to balance and contain indirect threats by using 
unconventional means.”41 Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith note that Russia is “more 
aggressive, assertive and frustrated with Western countries” and uses these asymmetric 
tactics as a means  to achieve its ends.42 They note that Russian grand strategy seeks to 
“maintain its status as a Great Power” and the use of asymmetric and gray zone tactics 
assist in achieving this goal.43 Person notes that regional powers are more likely to utilize 
 
36 Person, Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, 2019. 
37 Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1 (July 
2005): 37, https://doi.org/10.1162/0162288054894607. 
38 Person, Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, 2019. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Rain Ottis, “Analysis of the 2007 Cyber Attacks against Estonia from the Information Warfare 
Perspective,” Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 2008, 1. 
41 Person, Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, 2019. 
42 Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, “Russia and Hybrid Warfare—Going Beyond the Label,” 
Aleksanteri Papers, January 2016, 23. 
43 Ibid. 
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asymmetric balancing against hegemonic powers.44 Examples of tactics that fall under 
asymmetric balancing also fall under the purview of “gray zone” tactics. These are: cyber 
and information operations, propaganda, manipulation and discrediting democratic 
institutions, calculated ambiguity, and deception and denial.45 Gray zone tactics play a 
large role in how Russia carries out operations against its adversaries in order to achieve 
its end goal. Rod Thornton argues that the goal of these unconventional means is to use 
asymmetric tools and tactics to “defeat an adversary from the inside out.”46 Person notes 
instances such as Estonia in 2007 and the warfare against the state over the removal of a 
Russian statue, the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014, and election interference in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election.47  
2. Cyber Operations 
a. Cyber Operations Defined 
The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) defines cyberspace as, “a global domain within 
the information environment consisting of the interdependent networks of information 
technology infrastructures and resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications 
networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers.”48 In reference to 
cyberspace, the JCS defines a cyberspace attack as, “actions taken in cyberspace that create 
noticeable denial effects (i.e., degradation, disruption, or destruction) in cyberspace or 
manipulation that leads to denial that appears in a physical domain, and is considered a 
form of fires.”49 The United States has clear definitions in regard to cyberspace; recently 
NATO has begun to address the cyber domain as well. During the Wales Summit in 2014, 
the Alliance formally added cyber defense into NATO’s task structure for collective 
 
44 Person, “Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century,” May 3, 2019, 16. 
45 Ibid., 18. 
46 Renz and Smith, “Russia and Hybrid Warfare—Going Beyond the Label,” 55. 
47 Person, Russian Grand Strategy in the 21st Century, 2019, 19. 
48 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Cyberspace Operations, JP 3-12 (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
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defense, meaning cyberattacks could warrant an Article 5 response.50 During the following 
meeting, the Warsaw Summit in 2016, NATO reaffirmed that decision and recognized 
cyberspace as an operational domain in which NATO will defend itself.51  
b. Gray Zone Defined 
Gray zone warfare is increasingly used by countries that seek to disrupt 
international order and rise to power. The Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) defines gray zone as, “actions, which seek to gain advantage without provoking a 
conventional military response, are often difficult for free-market democracies to 
counter.”52 CSIS highlights how countries such as Russia and China “increasingly use non-
military means to achieve their objectives. These gray zone actions include election 
meddling, economic coercion, and the ambiguous use of unconventional force. Below the 
level of war…”53 Gray zone operations allow a state to operate in an area that falls below 
the threshold for armed attack. Hal Brands points out that “cyberattacks have proven to be 
a potent component of gray zone challenges in areas like Eastern Europe…spreading black 
propaganda and misinformation.”54 Michael Mazarr believes that gray zone operations are 
used by “revisionist states with grand geopolitical ambitions.”55 Mazarr argues, “Gray 
zone strategies pursue political objectives through calculated and integrated campaigns to 
achieve specific and often quite ambitious goals within a certain period of time.”56 
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Lyle Morris et al., in a RAND study, highlights multiple important points about 
gray zone activities with the first being, “gray zone elements remain below the threshold 
that would justify a military response.”57 The second point that the study notes is that gray 
zone activities, “unfold gradually over time rather than involving bold, all-encompassing 
actions to achieve objectives in one step.”58 The third point is that the aggressor looks for 
a, “lack of attributability” in order to disguise the role of the state in the action.59 Morris 
et al. highlights a total of eight characteristics that encompasses using international law to 
justify gray zone actions, ensuring they do not threaten a vital interest to avoid conflict, 
escalatory risk to coerce, uses nonmilitary tools to remain below the threshold for military 
response, and targeting specific vulnerabilities within a country.60 Essentially, the 
objective for the aggressor state is that a gray zone, “takes advantage of strategic ambiguity 
to achieve gradual gains.”61 
c. Information Warfare 
Information warfare strategy is the Western terminology for its view on Russia’s 
use of different cyber tools to compete in the information space. The Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) defines information warfare as, “strategy for the use and 
management of information to pursue a competitive advantage, including both offensive 
and defensive operations.”62 The Western definition of information warfare is similar to 
Russian “information confrontation [informatsionnoe protivoborstvo], or IPb” which 
Lesley Kucharski explains is what Russia uses as a major strategy against NATO and other 
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adversaries.63 Khatuna Mshvidobadze further explains information confrontation: “Russia 
views cyber-capabilities as tools of information warfare, which combines intelligence, 
counterintelligence, maskirovka, disinformation, electronic warfare, debilitation of 
communications, degradation of navigation support, psychological pressure, and 
destruction of enemy computer capabilities.”64 Information confrontation is a very broad 
strategy; Keir Giles points to how Russia utilizes cyber as a tool for achieving smaller more 
diverse information operational goals.65 Kucharski notes that Russian views on 
information confrontation differ from Western state views in that Russia considers not just 
technology and infrastructure, but also human emotions and responses which Western 
states do not consider as information.66 
The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) recently published Russia Military Power 
Report 2017, a report in which the DIA recognizes that Russia uses cyber and information 
confrontation as means to control adversaries without escalation to kinetic military 
conflict.67 Giles notes that it is important to understand that Russia does not differentiate 
cyberspace from the information space, in Russian strategy they are the same.68 Due to 
this, the scope of cyber in Russian strategy enables Russia to break down this space to 
include “information-technical” and “information-psychological” as the two areas of 
Russian focus.69 Timothy Thomas uses P. Koayesov’s definition of information-technical 
as, “blocking the operation of the enemy’s state and military command and control 
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systems.”70 Thomas also uses Koayesov’s definition of information-psychological which 
is, “exerting psychological information pressure on its leaders, Armed Forces personnel, 
and the population.”71 According to Giles, these two areas allow Russia to target 
information in order to disinform populations (psychological) and to target systems that 
collect, receive, and disseminate information (technical).72 Chief of Strategic 
Communications, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Mark Laity 
stated:  
The Russians use information from a covert stage through six phases of 
warfare to the re-establishment of victory. Information confrontation is 
conducted in every phase, including covertly, in peace and in war. Our 
doctrines do not allow us to do a lot of this stuff till the fighting basically 
starts.73 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The use of information confrontation is directly tied to gray zone strategies and is 
tightly woven into Russian operations in the cyber domain. Russian cyber operations have 
operated within the gray zone area targeting adversary institutions in order to achieve state 
objectives.74 This is the foundation for the first hypothesis, which is Russia’s strategic 
goals, within the grand strategy, are to create political destabilization and threaten critical 
infrastructure sectors and ultimately hinder the Alliance’s ability to respond to a 
cyberattack. Michael Connell and Sarah Vogler note that Russian cyber operations fall 
outside of the established norms and laws for the cyber domain.75 They highlight that these 
norms have a legal precedence that states are supposed to follow which makes it more 
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difficult for states to legally respond to Russia. Additionally, the second hypothesis 
identifies the impact of cyber operations and the potential to destabilize the NATO 
Alliance. Specifically, Russia utilizes cyber operations are continually adapting and 
changing in order to create a weakness within the Alliance posing a long-term risk to the 
Alliance, its member states’ security, and regional stability. 
In the 2017 Russian military power report published by the DIA, the report states 
that Russia sees the United States and its NATO Allies as a roadblock to achieving world 
power status and the respect the state deserves.76 Russia states in its 2015 National Security 
Strategy that the NATO Alliance’s buildup of military forces near Russia’s border was a 
direct threat to its national security.77 Russia’s views of NATO and its member states 
demonstrates that Russia wants to change the current relationship between NATO and 
itself. The DIA highlights, “Moscow perceives the information domain as strategically 
decisive and critically important to control its domestic populace and influence adversary 
states.”78 Russia’s use of information operations against adversary states and its 
willingness to do so highlights the need for NATO to be prepared to defend itself against 
information operations by Russia. Recent attacks also highlight the need to investigate 
Russia’s original intention behind cyberattacks and is the foundation for the third 
hypothesis: Regardless of true intentions, it is in Russia’s interest to portray their actions 
as defensive, and therefore to portray NATO expansion as the origin of aggression. If this 
hypothesis is plausible, then NATO may at least doubt the veracity of such protestations, 
and does not have to accept at face value that Russian leaders genuinely believe they are 
merely defensive actors. 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis utilizes strategy documents, joint publications, and scholarly writing on 
Russian strategy to assist in outlining Russian grand strategy. Scholarly writing as well as 
strategy documents will be used to analyze cyber operations and the role they play in 
Russian grand strategy. Expert reviews and government reports will be utilized to analyze 
case studies of Russian cyber incidents. These documents are used to create the best 
understanding of how Russia utilizes cyber as a tenet of information confrontation in order 
to achieve grand strategy. The white papers and scholarly writing on Russian information 
confrontation all follow a similar narrative that explains how Russian strategy is carried 
out and the potential effects it has. These documents are key pillars to the main argument 
for this thesis.  
This thesis uses a case study analysis to better understand the effects of Russian 
cyber operations. This approach is best to grasp how the cyber operations have become 
more effective and efficient over time. This has enabled Russia to conduct operations of 
similar ends against multiple states in order to further its own objectives. Russia views 
NATO expansion as a direct threat to Russia and reasoning behind this will be analyzed to 
discover where it fits into Russian grand strategy. Lack of political cohesion within the 
NATO Alliance creates a vulnerability for Russia to exploit. Political instability and 
distrust in the government can be analyzed through the 2016 presidential election, as well 
as the election tampering in Europe, because both are important case studies to showcase 
how Russia has adapted the use of cyber and technology to further the effectiveness of its 
activities. Civil preparedness and resiliency are key parts of NATO strength that Russia 
has attempted to exploit to diminish NATO’s capacity to respond during a crisis. Dragonfly 
and NotPetya displayed the progression of Russian cyber capabilities against critical 
infrastructure in a short period of time. The effectiveness and concerns highlighted by these 
cases are important to analyze in order for NATO states to better prepare to defend against 
cyber operations of this type. The disruption and damage that can be caused through critical 
infrastructure attacks has a global impact that far exceeds that of the United States and 
NATO. 
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F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER DESIGN 
The second chapter examines Russian grand strategy and cyber operations. It 
analyzes what Russian grand strategy is as well as what role and impact cyber operations 
have on the strategy. This chapter discusses cyber as a tenet of information confrontation 
and what Russia is attempting to achieve with these operations. 
The third chapter reviews three case studies for Russian election interference in 
NATO states and the United States in order to demonstrate the goals of the Russian grand 
strategy and cyber operations. The first case study is focused on election interference due 
to how directly attacking democratic states creates a distrust in the governmental processes 
that strengthen these states. Weakening states internally has the ability to weaken the 
Alliance as a whole.79 The third chapter also assesses Russian cyber operations against 
critical infrastructure and energy sectors in the United States and NATO. The second case 
study is the Dragonfly operation against U.S. and European energy sectors. Globalization 
and technology rely on power provided by the energy sector in order to carry out daily 
operations. Without power or technology most organizations come to halt or are greatly 
slowed as seen with the NotPetya cyberattack.80 The third case study is focused on the 
NotPetya cyberattack. While NotPetya did not target a NATO state directly, it did affect 
multiple NATO states in the process. It is important to grasp the effects of that operation 
due to the fact that this attack highlights the potential damage cyber operations can create.  
The fourth chapter contains the findings and suggestions. Chapter V focuses on 
what the evidence presented by the case studies shows about Russia’s grand strategy. The 
findings and implications will analyze what the role of these cyber operations are and what 
Russia is attempting to achieve through its use of information confrontation. While 
examining the strategy it is critical to recognize the appropriate responses of NATO states 
and their allies in order to prevent Russia from exploiting its cyber capabilities further. 
Thorough analysis of the strategy and case studies will assist NATO leaders in creating 
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strategy and policy that will further strengthen the Alliance against Russian cyber 
operations. Greater understanding will assist these leaders in effectively defending their 




II. GRAND STRATEGY: RUSSIAN GOALS AND 
CYBER OPERATIONS  
This chapter is divided into two distinct sections. First, it explores Russian grand 
strategy and key goals and related objectives defined in Russian policy documents. Second, 
this chapter analyzes cyber operations as a tool to assist in achieving grand strategy 
objectives. This chapter provides analysis of Russian strategic documents in order to 
determine broader Russian strategic goals. In addition, the grand strategy section defines 
the Russian views on U.S. and NATO expansion, world power status, and the expansion 
of Russia’s sphere of influence in Europe. The second section focuses on cyber operations 
as a key part of Russian information operations. It examines the actors Russia utilizes for 
cyber operations, to politically fracture NATO, and diminish NATO’s capacity to respond 
in crisis. Chapter II begins the process of answering the first sub-question: What is the 
relationship of Russian grand strategy to the NATO Alliance? Defining grand strategy 
goals as well as Russia’s goals through cyber operations is critical to the upcoming case 
study chapter. 
A. RUSSIAN GRAND STRATEGY 
Robert Person highlights the three goals of Russian grand strategy as follows: 
containing U.S. and NATO expansion, achieving world power status, and creating a greater 
sphere of influence in Europe.81 According to Geir Karlsen, it is critical to synthesize 
Russian policies to better understand how Russian strategies have long-term objectives.82 
The 2016 Russian Foreign Policy Concept delineates five objectives and principles of 
importance to Russia with specific regard to its position with other states.83 These five are: 
“General Provisions;” “Modern World and Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation;” 
“Priorities of the Russian Federation and Overcoming Global Challenges Shaping a Fair 
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and Sustainable World Order;” “Regional Foreign Policy Priorities of the Russian 
Federation;” and “Russian’s Foreign Policy Formulation and Implementation.”84 These 
priorities provide specific guidance with regard to national and international cyber 
operations.85 Russia utilizes a myriad of tools and tactics in order to attempt to strengthen 
its position as a strong state in the competitive global sphere. The Russian Foreign Policy 
concept notes that the use of military, information technology, and soft power such as 
information and communication are important tools for achieving the objectives of the 
state.86 Russian grand strategy goals are prioritized by aligning the doctrine and different 
areas of the state to focus on important objectives. Russia utilizes its National Security 
Strategy (NSS) and the Military Doctrine in combination with the Foreign Policy Concept 
to create a consensus within the state policy. 
The current NSS of Russia highlights six key areas of concern and priorities of 
focus for the Russian Federation.87 These six are: “General Provisions;” “Russia in the 
Modern World;” “National Interests and Strategic Priorities;” “Ensuring National 
Security;” “Organizational, Regulatory-Legal, and Information Foundations for 
Implementing This Strategy;” and “Main Indicators of the State of National Security.”88 
Within the NSS, Russia states the United States and its allies, such as NATO, seek to 
contain Russia in order to preserve the global dominance of these states. The NSS also 
highlights NATO, specifically, as a threat to Russian national security due to the expansion 
of the Alliance and military tools to states closer to Russian borders.89 Julien Nocetti notes 











counter a perceived offensive threat.90 The 2014 Military Doctrine of the Russian 
Federation also highlights NATO build-up of forces and expansion near Russian borders 
as an external military risk to its sovereignty.91 The Russian Foreign Policy concept 
describes the Russian understanding on issues it views as critical: 
The Russian Federation maintains its negative perspective toward NATO’s 
expansion, the Alliance’s military infrastructure approaching Russian 
borders, and its growing military activity in regions neighbouring Russia, 
viewing them as a violation of the principle of equal and indivisible security 
and leading to the deepening of old dividing lines in Europe and to the 
emergence of new ones.92 
Russia’s belief that it needs to respond defensively to NATO further exacerbates 
the current NATO-Russian relationship.  
The defensive mindset of Russian policy-makers concerning what is perceived as a 
larger threat, NATO, has shaped the way policy-makers define Russian strategy. Lesley 
Kucharski states that Russia is falling back on a Soviet Union style of planning and 
thinking.93 Kucharski lists six non-military instruments Russia adapted from Soviet 
techniques as: “political influence operations,” “disinformation,” “propaganda,” “media 
manipulation and control,” “front organizations,” and “non-ruling communist parties.”94 
Along with adapting this Soviet style of thinking, Russia aims to avoid costly confrontation 
when protecting its national interests.95 According to Stacie Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser, 
“gray zone tactics are cheap in terms of cost and risk, Russia is willing to liberally use them 
even when the prospect of success is low.”96 The gray zone has become an essential part 
 
90 Andrei P. Tsygankov, ed., Routledge Handbook of Russian Foreign Policy (London; New York: 
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2018). 
91 Kremlin, The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia: Kremlin, 2014), 
http://rusemb.org.uk/press/2029. 
92 Kremlin, Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. 
93 Kucharski, “Russian Multi-Domain Strategy against NATO: Information Confrontation and U.S. 
Forward-Deployed Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” 2018, 13. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Kremlin, Russian National Security Strategy. 
96 Stacie Pettyjohn and Becca Wasser, Competing in the Gray Zone: Russian Tactics and Western 
Responses (RAND Corporation, 2019), 32, https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2791. 
22 
of Russian Military Doctrine, and the Gerasimov Doctrine, named after General Valery 
Gerasimov, further explains the role asymmetric tactics, gray zone operations, play in 
achieving the goals of Russia. General Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the 
Russian Federation Armed Forces, wrote an article explaining the new way of modern 
warfare in which he stated, “The very ‘rules of war’ have changed. The role of nonmilitary 
means of achieving political and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, they have 
exceeded the power of force of weapons in their effectiveness.”97 Russia has shifted from 
using purely conventional forces to prioritizing asymmetric political and informational 
activities to further achieve the state’s strategic objectives without resorting to force-on-
force conflict.  
Russia’s grand strategy is driven in part by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who 
stated, “the demise of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 
[20th] century.”98 This statement explains President Putin’s personal views on the current 
state of affairs within Russia and helps NATO understand the direction President Putin has 
for the Russian Federation. The collapse of the Soviet Union saw Russia attempt to reform 
the government toward democracy, but the state struggled to accept democracy.99 Russia 
has been shifting away from democracy and toward autocracy with President Putin as the 
leader and driver of Russia’s future.100 Fiona Hill contends that this leaves Russia and 
President Putin with a strategic advantage over democratic institutions: 
[President Putin’s] ability to translate quick thinking into action and change 
course at the last minute gives him a significant advantage over Western 
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leaders, who are always institutionally constrained in their decision-making, 
and usually have limits on the methods they can use to respond to a crisis.101 
Hill argues that the autocratic state of ruling within Russia has enabled it to be able 
to make strategic moves that are more difficult for democratic Western states and 
institutions to navigate.102 
Success of Russian grand strategy is dependent on its execution and long-term 
commitment to Russian strategic goals. Karlsen notes that Russia has a strategy of “Divide 
and Rule” to achieve Russian goals in regard to Western states and institutions.103 Karlsen 
further explains, based on evidence compiled by Western security institutions, that Russia 
has three levels of divide and rule which are to: divide European alliances such as NATO 
and the European Union (EU), create distrust and division between states, and to create 
internal division within  a state.104 Divide and Rule is critical to Russia’s success in 
achieving its three grand strategy goals. In order to achieve these goals Russia understands 
the importance of weakening its adversaries and further bolstering its own strength.  
1. NATO Containment 
Russia’s 2015 NSS highlights the belief that NATO is expanding in order to contain 
Russian influence. In addition, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept states, “Systemic 
problems in the Euro-Atlantic region that have accumulated over the last quarter century 
are manifested in the geopolitical expansion pursued by [NATO].”105 This policy 
continues, stating that containment policies used by NATO undermine Russia and are 
detrimental to long-term stability and cooperation.106 Russian leaders echo these concerns 
when questioned about NATO expansionism. During an interview about the Ukrainian 
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NATO responses to the conflict, “If the catastrophe in Ukraine had not happened some 
other grounds would have been found to step up the policy of ‘containment’ of our country 
[Russia].”107 Michael Rühle notes that Russia views NATO “as a hostile alliance” which 
has a large role in Russian politics and decision-making.108 Russian views of NATO as a 
hostile organization echo the defensive posturing and external beliefs that are found within 
Russia’s greater strategic and policy documents. 
NATO expansion has been a historically contentious topic between Russia and the 
West since the fall of the Soviet Union. During the 43rd Munich Conference on Security 
Policy, President Putin stated his belief that NATO expansion is a provocation that goes 
against assurances made by Western states when the Warsaw Pact dissolved in 1990.109 
In March of 2014 President Putin addressed Russian Parliament, stating, “On the contrary, 
they [NATO] have lied to us many times, made decisions behind our backs, placed us 
before an accomplished fact. This happened with NATO’s expansion to the East, as well 
as the deployment of military infrastructure at our borders.”110 Mark Kramer explained 
that there is a belief within Russia that when NATO and Russia negotiated German 
reunification, NATO expansion was addressed and promises were made not to expand 
eastward.111 However, scholars have analyzed recently declassified documents related to 
this negotiation and have found no formal commitment in regard to expansion of NATO 
eastward.112 Russia firmly states that a promise was made not to expand the Alliance and 
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consequently views current NATO expansion as a strategy of containment meant to hold 
Russia back from rising to power.113 
2. World Power Status 
The definition of power is widely debated among scholars within international 
relations and Joseph Nye states “Power, like love, is easier to experience than to define or 
measure.”114 He defines power as “the ability to achieve one’s purpose or goals.”115 Nye 
narrows the definition of power to “the ability to influence the behavior of others to get the 
outcomes one wants.”116 Kenneth Waltz defines power simply as the “notion that an agent 
is powerful to the extent that he affects others more than they affect him.”117 For the 
purpose of this research, power encompasses the ability to influence other states as a crucial 
part of a state’s ability to gain respect and control on the international scale.118 Russia’s 
Foreign Policy Concept states that a main objective of Russia is: “to consolidate the 
Russian Federation’s position as a centre of influence in today’s world.”119 States at the 
center of influence have the most power and say over the changing international 
environment. Nikolay Patrushev stated that following the Russian intervention in Ukraine, 
the United States “was clearly alarmed by Russia’s obvious intention to take its place 
among the world powers of the 21st century and uphold the principle of equal opportunities 
and full autonomy in global politics.”120 Patrushev made this statement in regard to 
Russia’s plan to sculpt a multipolar world in which Russia competes against world power’s 
such as the United States for a voice on international issues. This plan falls in line with the 
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balance-of-power theory of international relations. Kenneth Waltz explains that in balance-
of-power politics, two or more states exist in a system of self-help, with one being superior 
and the other having to help themselves in order to compete, survive, and gain power.121 
Balance-of-power theory aligns with Russia’s views that NATO is attempting to contain 
Russia and therefore Russia needs more power to survive in the international system. 
Russia’s policy delineates a clear position for the state to obtain status as a global 
power. Andrei Tsygankov states that Russian leaders are continually shaping the political 
landscape so Russia can be recognized as a world power in the eyes of the West.122 The 
2015 NSS states that Russia seeks to consolidate its role as a leading world power in order 
to shape a polycentric world.123 Gray zone tactics are useful for Russia to shape and 
achieve its world power goal. Russia is perceived as a weaker state in the international 
order; however, these tactics allow Russia to position itself competitively against stronger 
states and institutions such as the United States and NATO.124 Greg Simons notes that 
Russia has had success in Foreign Policy due to the state’s ability to utilize asymmetric 
tools that are difficult for a democratic state or institution to respond to.125  
3. Greater Sphere of Influence in Europe 
Several Russian experts have highlighted that Russia wants to expand its influence 
over former states of the Soviet Union. In particular, Michael Kofman notes that Russia 
has a “drive to restore a privileged sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union.”126 
Kofman argues that Russia views these states as a buffer zone against NATO and that 
NATO wants to use them as a buffer zone against Russia. He continues, stating that Russian 
leaders see these buffer states as an extended security zone needed to create space against 
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its perceived Western adversaries. The Russian Federation views its neighboring states as 
a strategic necessity to maintain security and control of its borders. Kofman also states, that 
while Russia views these states from a security standpoint, it also believes that it is the 
“rightful hegemon in its own region, and [needs to] reintegrate the former Soviet space to 
the extent possible around its own leadership.”127 Through the reintegration of former 
Soviet states, Russia envisions its ability to increase regional influence in Europe as well 
as create a greater buffer zone with NATO. 
Several military and academic experts have analyzed Russian actions to determine 
what ends Russian strategy is trying to achieve through expanding influence in Europe. 
John Allen, Philip Breedlove, Julian Lindley-French, and George Zambellas co-authored a 
paper concerning NATO strategy in future war with Russia.128 These authors argue that 
post-Cold War Russia intends to rewrite European borders to create a “more Russia-
friendly balance of power in Europe” in order to destabilize Western European states.129 
They state that Russia seeks to “compel the rest [Western European states] to comply with 
Russian strategic interests.”130 With a restructured security framework in Europe, Russia 
can sow division and destabilize the NATO Alliance in order to expand Russian interests. 
Thomas Graham argues that Russia views itself surrounded by countries that are 
economically, politically, or demographically more dynamic that it is.131 He notes that due 
to this, “Russian leaders fear for the survival and territorial integrity of their country.”132 
Russia’s defensive mindset in regard to its geographical and geopolitical position within 
Europe is a consistent driver of its grand strategy and strategic objectives. 
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B. CYBER TO ACHIEVE GRAND STRATEGY  
Western views of cyber operations and the cyber realm parallel Russian information 
warfare and tactics. Information warfare, or information confrontation, as Russia calls it, 
utilizes cyber as an avenue to carry out operations that are in line with the goals of the 
state.133 Russia’s Foreign Policy concept states that information technical capabilities used 
in coordination with the military can influence states and international politics.134 With 
this in mind, Russia has established a Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian 
Federation, defining “the strategic objectives and key areas of information security taking 
into account the strategic national priorities of the Russian Federation.”135 Nocetti states 
that, “The Kremlin fully considers the Internet as a foreign policy item,” and due to this, 
Russia realizes the effect the cyber and information operations conducted over the internet 
has on national security.136 
Russian information operations have embraced ambiguity through gray zone 
activities in order to further Russian strategic goals. Russian literature refers to cyberspace 
and cyber operations when referring to Western state activities, but utilizes information 
operations or information confrontation in regard to Russian cyber operations.137 The 2010 
Russian Military Doctrine highlights how modern military conflicts rely on information 
confrontation to be used to achieve a political objective without using military force to 
shape responses from adversary states.138 The Military Doctrine was updated in 2014 and 
it highlights the importance of utilizing asymmetric and indirect methods to achieve a 
favorable response.139 The 2014 Military Doctrine also highlights “the development of 
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forces and means of information warfare” as an important task that the Russian military 
needs to be equipped to handle. Russia’s focus on strengthening its information warfare 
and operations capabilities is critical to growing its influence. 
Russia utilizes cyber as a way to maintain its defensive posture against the 
perceived threat by Western institutions.140 Greg Simons states that, “Russia maintains 
that it is fighting a defensive informational war in its foreign policy, which contradicts the 
mainstream Western political narrative that it is fighting an offensive war.”141 Russia’s 
foreign policy decisions and actions are tied to the achievement of its grand strategy. 
Nocetti highlights that Russia’s defensive mindset has led to changes in Russian foreign 
policy and security, utilizing cyber “as an asymmetric weapon, in an unequal balance of 
power as Russia’s conventional means remain inferior to NATO’s.”142 Ambiguity is one 
of the hallmark tools of gray zone tactics, making it more difficulty to attribute blame and 
surmise the true intent of an information operation. Connell and Vogler note that Russia 
has further developed a way to carry out cyber operations against Western states that allow 
the state to avoid attribution for the attack.143 These authors highlight how Russia has 
efficiently utilized hackers-for-hire to enable the state’s gray zone activities and maintain 
anonymity. Gray zone operations and anonymity allow Russia and other states to maintain 
a level of ambiguity that enables the state to effectively avoid direct blame for an incident. 
Connell and Vogler note that “plausible deniability with regard to disinformation 
campaigns” is critical to the achievement of Russian objectives.144 
Information operations utilized through the cyber domain play a key role in the 
achievement of strategic ends. Margarita Jaitner quotes Colonel Sergei Chekinov and 
Lieutenant General Sergei Bogdanov, who stated in 2010 that “Today the means of 
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information influence reached such perfection that they can tackle strategic tasks.”145 
Jaitner highlights another important quote from Chekinov and Bogdanov: “It is critical that 
such activities [information operationa] begin prior to the onset of traditional military 
operations.”146 The introduction of influence operations before a wartime operation allows 
Russia to attempt to weaken an adversary before traditional conflict ensues. Nocetti notes 
that an interesting aspect of Russian information confrontation is that these operations are 
carried out consistently during peacetime as well as wartime.147  
Cyber is an effective tool that Russia has adapted into its military and political 
arsenal to enable successful achievement of its grand strategy. Cyber has multiple roles 
when it comes to achieving a strategic interest. Karlsen highlights the role that cyber plays 
in dividing a population internally via disinformation and misinformation as a covert means 
to influence the population.148 He continues stating that Russia also utilizes overt force or 
coercion in the energy and critical infrastructure sectors to influence an adversary state. 
Karlsen states that a specific long-term strategic goal for Russia is to utilize information 
and influence operations to weaken NATO and its security position in the international 
order. Giles states that a key strategic goal for Russia would be to destabilize NATO, 
through information operations, to the point where if the Alliance needed to invoke an 
Article 5 commitment that it would be unable to reach a consensus decision.149 
Destabilizing NATO at this level requires long-term commitment to degrading 
relationships within not only the Alliance but also within individual states of the Alliance 
which Karlsen notes is what Western security institutions believe to be a key goal of 
Russian cyber operations to divide the Alliance.150  
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1. Cyber Actors 
Russia uses a myriad of different actors in order to further the ambiguity of its gray 
zone operations as well as attribution avoidance. Giles describes so-called “Information 
Troops,” who are a type of “Information Special Forces” within the military, that Russia 
utilizes to carry out its information cyber operations: 
To construct information countermeasures, it is necessary to develop a 
centre for the determination of critically important information entities of 
the enemy, including how to eliminate them physically, and how to conduct 
electronic warfare, psychological warfare, systemic counterpropaganda, 
and net operations to include hacker training.151 
Giles lists the personnel necessary to carry out this order as “diplomats, experts, 
journalists, writers, publicists, translators, operators, communications personnel, web 
designers, hackers, and others.”152 This diverse group is what enables Russia to covertly 
carry out its information operations as an aspect of gray zone that allows for the necessary 
level of ambiguity.  
Russia’s broad use of actors to carry out these operations sets them apart from most 
other state actors in cyberspace. Connell and Vogler describe how Russia uses nonstate 
actors, such as hackers-for-hire, in order to carry out operations.153 Another group of 
nonstate hackers is called “hacktivists,” who for political or nationalist reasons will 
undertake cyber operations on Russia’s behalf.154 These hacktivists are a cost effective 
way for Russia to achieve strategic ends due to the hackers providing their own resources 
to successfully carry out an operation. They also provide the added benefit of anonymity 
and attribution difficulties due to the fact they are not directly tied to the state and appear 
to be operating on their own accord.155 President Putin has denounced the actions of these 
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hacktivists as not being guided by the state, but he has still titled them “patriotic hackers” 
who are free to act in the best interests of the Russian Federation.156  
2. Political Fracturing 
NATO is a strong alliance that evinces the political ideals of free democracy, 
security, and a voice for the people. Russia by contrast is an autocratic state with policy 
and decision-making driven by the top leaders. Anne Applebaum explains that democracy 
threatens President Putin and Russia’s way of operating, and democracy cannot be allowed 
in Russia.157 She continues, stating that, because of this threat, Russia is devoting 
extensive resources to “a political and information war designed to undermine and 
eventually destroy Western democracies as well as Western institution.”158 Lesley 
Kucharski highlights that Russia exploits “perceived vulnerabilities of these democratic 
societies…in order to exacerbate pre-existing societal, political, and military divisions, 
thereby degrading NATO cohesion.”159 Kucharski argues that Russia is able to utilize 
cyber and information in order to influence government officials as well as populations 
within a state in order to further spread Russian goals.160 Russia actively uses propaganda 
to spread its interests globally and has even spread disinformation to attempt to influence 
populations globally through the use of the internet and social medias.161 Influence 
operations against a state’s population can spread decisive views with social media with 
the ability to further divide a state; this is a part of Karlsen’s findings that Russia is 
attempting to target populations to divide and rule.162 
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A state that is embroiled with internal issues is slower to respond to external issues, 
such as a threat to the NATO Alliance.163 World leaders are beginning to recognize the 
dangers of a divided NATO and its ability to respond to external threats. For instance, 
Polish President Andrzej Duda recently referenced Russia’s goal to “pit NATO members 
against one another, to incite discord and doubts among states, between us and our 
neighbours.”164 Russia’s attempts to divide the NATO Alliance place it in a more secure 
position of power. Kucharski finds that, based on Russian information operational goals, 
Russia seeks to gain strategic victory through subversive actions to destabilize foreign 
governments while maintaining stability in Russia.165 Giles notes the multitude of ways 
that Russia uses information operations through social media to destabilize and 
delegitimize adversaries through the spread of disinformation and propaganda that 
damages adversaries while strengthening Russia’s position.166 
3. Diminish NATO Capacity to Respond 
NATO resiliency and civil preparedness are important factors when it comes to 
NATO’s ability to respond during a crisis, such as a critical infrastructure failure due to a 
cyberattack. Allen, Breedlove, Lindley-French, and Zambellas argue that a weaker state, 
such as Russia, can utilize the internet, technology, and other cyber tools to weaken a far 
stronger opponent and cause disproportionate damage to an adversary.167 These authors 
highlight how cyber operations have the ability to disrupt energy, the telephone, computer 
systems, transportation operations, TV, and social media to create chaos and push 
propaganda that creates a divide and slows the response of the victim state.168 The growth 
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of cyber and connectivity into everyday lives of citizens creates a target of opportunity for 
a weaker state such as Russia.169 Ambiguity and relative cost effectiveness of cyber and 
information operations creates an easier way to disrupt and divide a population from 
within.170 
James Wirtz argues that Russia is using cyber to diminish NATO’s ability to 
respond by continually carrying out cyber and information operations that produce minimal 
destruction but create issues for the Alliance. He writes that, “In effect, the Russians seem 
to have realized that by defeating NATO’s strategy at the outset of a confrontation, they 
can actually alter political perceptions within the Alliance in a way that suits their 
objectives.”171 Similarly, Nocetti highlights that Russia is combining cyber and foreign 
policy to achieve its strategic goals. She states in regard to cyber that, “Russia is eager to 
challenge NATO member states’ reactions and capacities, while blurring the lines between 
cybersecurity and the Russian concept of information security.”172 A fractured NATO 
Alliance is slower to respond in crisis, a situation which Russia understands, and due to 
this, it uses a multitude of cyber and information tools to further destabilize the Alliance’s 
ability to respond quickly.173  
C. CONCLUSION: RUSSIA’S GRAND STRATEGY AND CYBER 
OPERATIONS AS A TOOL  
Russian grand strategy utilizes a vast array of tools available to the state in order to 
further the power and position of the state. Asymmetric gray zone operations utilizing 
cyber are a main tool that Russia employs to achieve grand strategy objectives. Cyber plays 
a crucial role in wearing down NATO over time in order to strengthen Russia’s position. 
Russian information operations thrive on ambiguity and attribution difficulties, which is 
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why they are so useful for Russia to remain under the radar of other states. This ambiguity 
gives Russia more latitude to avoid direct blame for these operations, and therefore more 
freedom to operate without triggering a direct response from NATO.  
The reach of the internet and connected resources online enables Russia to carry 
out operations globally utilizing a variety of its “Information Troops” to achieve strategic 
objectives. Russian views of the outside world and competitive sphere against NATO are 
driving factors for Russia’s actions, with Putin recently stating his concern that continued 
NATO expansion posed a threat to Russia.174 Putin’s statement points to the defensive 
posturing that Russia is currently undertaking through the use of information operations in 
order to strengthen its position. Achievement of grand strategy focuses on long-term goals 
with Russian operations piling up over time to slowly change the international sphere in its 
favor. 
The following chapter will explore the role cyber operations play in achieving 
Russian grand strategy. Analysis will focus on four case studies, with two focusing on 
sowing discord within adversary states and two focusing on the ability to target critical 
infrastructure to slow an adversary’s ability to respond in a crisis. In keeping with the theme 
of gray zone and ambiguity, the case studies display the attribution issues, motivating 
factors, and delivery methods of cyber operations in order to achieve Russian grand 
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III. CASE STUDIES: RUSSIAN CYBER OPERATIONS 
AGAINST NATO STATES 
This chapter examines four incidents involving Russian cyber operations and 
subsequent impact on NATO members and partners—the 2016 U.S. presidential election 
interference, the 2017 French presidential election interference, the Dragonfly operations 
from 2013–2017, and the 2017 NotPetya cyberattack on Ukraine. It should be noted that 
although it is difficult to attribute blame for a cyberattack, the United States is the 
prominent global leader that openly contends Russia’s cyber actors are responsible for 
these incidents.  
The case studies were selected for several analytical reasons to best address this 
thesis’ primary research question—what is the intersection between Russian cyber 
operations and grand strategy to weaken the NATO Alliance? First, these cases were 
sourced from a multitude of state and expert scholarly research on Russian cyber activities. 
Secondly, these four cases demonstrate the scope of Russian cyber activities intended to 
sow discord as well as disrupt operations within NATO states. Thirdly, these four cases 
show an increase in ability and effectiveness suggesting that Russia is continually learning 
from previous cyber operations to structure future operations. Additionally, these cases 
analyze Russian cyber operations targeting political cohesion as well as the critical 
infrastructure resiliency of NATO states. 
Russia uses a multitude of cyber actors known as Advanced Persistent Threat 
(APT) groups in state sponsored cyber operations.175 Two well-known APT actors are 
APT28 and APT29 which are also associated with a myriad of other names. APT28 is 
known as “Fancy Bear, Pawn Storm, Sofacy Group, Sednit and STRONTIUM” while 
APT29 is known as “Cozy Bear, Office Monkeys, CozyCar, The Dukes, and 
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CozyDuke.”176 Several of these names will be referenced throughout these case studies in 
regard to APT28 and APT29.  
A. 2016 U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
1. Overview 
The Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) joint report, published on January 
7, 2017, by the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), discovered that in June 2014, the Internet 
Research Agency (IRA) located in St. Petersburg sent two employees to begin 
reconnaissance and intelligence gathering for the organization to carry out “information 
warfare against the United States.”177 This early reconnaissance operation was used to 
refine IRA tactics to advance its information influence operations in the US.178  
These influence operations were utilized, as the ICA claimed, to “undermine public 
faith in the U.S. democratic process” through the use of social media “trolls” to spread 
disinformation throughout the election season and after.179 Brian Barrett reports that as 
early as June 27, 2015, “Russian Intelligence group Cozy Bear … also known as APT29—
infiltrated the DNC [Democratic National Committee] network.”180 APT29  has been 
linked to the SVR which is Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service.181 CrowdStrike, the 
cybersecurity firm that discovered the DNC hack, reports that Fancy Bear, APT28, 
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infiltrated the DNC in April 2016 separately from Cozy Bear.182 CrowdStrike notes that 
these two actors appeared to operate independently of each other to achieve the same 
objective. These hacks lead to the leaking of close to 20,000 emails through WikiLeaks 
with the intent to disrupt the political process.183 Pawn storm, APT28, released these 
documents to the mainstream media as “exclusive access” in order to “publicize their 
attacks and influence public opinion.”184 
2. Contextual Analysis 
This case is crucial to understanding the effects influence operations can have on a 
population through disinformation as well as sowing discord. Central to the incident’s 
repercussions is the consistent message that multiple Russia state actors have been blamed 
for cyber operations and disinformation campaigns during the 2016 U.S. presidential 
election. The ICA report assessed that “Moscow will apply lessons learned from its 
campaign aimed at the U.S. presidential election to future influence efforts in the United 
States and worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes.”185 The 
recent Select Committee on Intelligence U.S. Senate report on “Russian Active Measures 
Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election” stated that Russia’s influence in the 
election was an attack on U.S. democracy, but it was not the first time Russia used 
“asymmetric warfare against America.”186 This report establishes that Russia favors 
information operations due to the difficulty of defending against them. More narrowly, it 
is relevant to recognize how cost-effective cyber and information operations are compared 
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to conventional military operations.187 Not only are information operations cost effective, 
but the U.S. Senate report found that they also pose a difficult threat for “military alliances 
like NATO” to effectively respond and prepare for strategic defenses.188 
3. Event Timeline 
According to the U.S. Senate Report and the Special Counsel’s Office, “by April 
2014, the IRA had formed a new department inside the larger organization that was focused 
solely on the U.S. population.”189 This department was referenced “as the ‘translator 
project,’” which continued to grow in size and presence as the election season picked up 
in 2016.190 After the translator project was started, the IRA sent employees to the United 
States in June of 2014 to refine social media tactics, study societal issues, political views, 
and online activities in the US.191 This early reconnaissance was used to tailor the IRA’s 
activities to most effectively carry out information warfare operations within the US.192 
The purpose of the IRA was to use “trolls,” which are paid social media users, to further 
spread disinformation, propaganda, and societal division.193 
The DNC believes that by July 27, 2015, Cozy Bear (APT29) hacked into the 
DNC’s systems.194 The Joint Analysis Report (JAR) published by the FBI states that Cozy 
Bear gained access to the systems using a targeted spearphishing campaign that sent 
malicious email links to 1,000 people with ties to the DNC and U.S. government.195 
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Spearphishing uses fake emails with attachments or links used to attempt to trick an 
individual into providing credentials that are needed to login to a system.196 The JAR states 
that throughout the spearphishing campaign, APT29 “used legitimate domains, to include 
domains associated with U.S. organizations and educational institutions, to host malware 
and send spearphishing emails.”197 Once APT29 gained access to the system, it was able 
to steal credentials, hide its presence, analyze and gather intelligence information, and 
establish command and control.198 APT29 continued to exfiltrate emails and other 
documents until its discovery in April of 2016. 
On April 18, 2016, Fancy Bear (APT28) gained access to the DNC’s systems.199 
The JAR states that APT28 gained access using targeted spearphishing campaigns that 
“tricked recipients into changing their passwords through a fake webmail domain hosted 
on APT28 operational infrastructure.”200 CrowdStrike reports that Fancy Bear is a Russian 
actor that typically targets organizations of strategic interest to Russia and is believed to 
have ties to the Main Intelligence Department or GRU.201 The JAR states that “APT28 
was able to gain access and steal content, likely leading to the exfiltration of information 
from multiple senior party members,” information which was “leaked to the press and 
publicly disclosed.”202 The DNC discovered the presence of unusual cyber activity on 
April 28, 2016, which led to the DNC calling in cybersecurity firm CrowdStrike to 
investigate.203 In a DNC lawsuit, it is revealed that the Russian hackers had access “not 
only to email systems, but also to backup servers, VOIP calls, and chats.”204 The damage 
cost the DNC over a million dollars and it “had to ‘decommission more than 140 servers, 
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remove and reinstall all software, including the operating systems, for more than 180 
computers, and rebuild at least 11 servers.’”205  
Barret reports that on June 14, 2016, the DNC publically disclosed that it had been 
hacked and “the following day, persona going by Guccifer 2.0 … claimed responsibility, 
leaking a 237-page opposition research report on Donald Trump in the process.”206 
Starting in June,  “Guccifer 2.0” gave 20,000 emails and reports to WikiLeaks as a way of 
interfering with the election.207 It was believed that Guccifer 2.0 was actually a Russian 
agent, and on October 7, 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) released a 
statement that “the U.S. Intelligence Community (USIC) is confident that the Russian 
Government directed the recent compromise of e-mails from U.S. persons and institutions, 
including from U.S. political organizations [DNC].”208 Mai Schotz reports that Guccifer 
2.0 was eventually traced to a Moscow IP address; U.S. investigators “traced it [the IP 
address] directly to the GRU headquarters.”209 
While APT28 and APT29 were hacking the DNC to undermine the presidential 
election, the IRA was stepping up its social media presence to spread disinformation and 
sow discord.210 The ICA reports that in March 2016, RT and Sputnik, which are Russia 
funded media outlets, began to express support for candidate Donald Trump.211 The ICA 
also finds that Russia, through the IRA, utilized trolls to “influence efforts to denigrate 
Secretary Clinton. This effort amplified stories on scandals about Secretary Clinton and the 
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role of WikiLeaks in the election campaign.”212 The Senate Report found that, “often 
within the context of the election or in reference to a candidate, most IRA content discreetly 
messaged narratives of disunity, discontent, hopelessness, and contempt of others, all 
aimed at sowing societal division.”213 The USIC estimates that over 100 million 
Americans were reached through Russian social media influence campaigns.214 
4. Findings and Implications 
Russia’s strategic attempt to disrupt U.S. Democratic processes poses serious 
concern for foreign influence within Western states and domestic affairs. Russian actions 
to directly interfere in the democratic election process via cyber intrusions as well as 
influencing the population through social media demonstrated the antithesis of the defined 
stance on “non-interference in domestic affairs of States” as stated in its Foreign Policy 
Concept.215 The ICA concludes that “President Putin ordered an influence campaign in 
2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election.”216 Additionally, “Moscow’s influence 
campaign followed a Russian messaging strategy that blends covert intelligence 
operations—such as cyber activity—with overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, 
state-funded media, third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ‘trolls.’”217 
Although President Putin continues to deny that Russia had any involvement in election 
interference, evidence affirms that Russia intentionally meddled in the Democratic 
electoral process on an unprecedented scale.218 Central to this case, CrowdStrike revealed 
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that APT28 and APT29, respectively, had ties to the GRU and SVR but were operating 
independently of each other to achieve the same goal of stealing election information for 
public release, actions which potentially lead to their intrusion being discovered.219 
Widespread use of social media by Americans made it easier for Russia to target 
the general population. This expansive approach made it easier for Russia to spread 
propaganda directed at different populations in order to target societal division and weaken 
the United States domestically. Russia’s ability to sow discord through the 2016 
presidential election and beyond has led to a more divisive U.S. population. The ICA report 
concludes that Russia will take the lessons learned from the United States and apply them 
“to future influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election 
processes.”220 Specifically, the findings indicate that social media information has the 
potential to impact voter’s decision making processes. As a result, it is plausible that 
misinformation campaigns, as an emerging warfare tactic, should be considered with 
countermeasures to minimize potential threats to democratic processes. 
Political cohesion is critical for the security and strength of NATO and each state 
needs to be able to respond to a crisis with effectiveness and speed. Russia’s ability to 
divide individual states of NATO affirms the potential for current and future negative 
impacts on the Alliance. Past actions demonstrate Russia’s intentional use of grand strategy 
to weaken individual states with the potential to weaken the organization itself. Domestic 
issues could potentially divert states from recognizing an impending threat to the NATO 
Alliance from Russia, and this places Russia in a strategically advantageous position. 
Russian interference in the U.S. presidential election was directed specifically at the United 
States and through this disruption had the potential to affect the NATO Alliance by 
weakening a member state domestically. This interference allowed Russia to test the limits 
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of accepted behavior by a state within the cyberspace domain in order to determine the 
response level from an adversary state.221  
B. 2017 FRENCH PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
1. Overview 
Due to reported Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the 
National Cybersecurity Agency of France (ANSSI) took proactive actions in preparation 
to protect France’s presidential candidates and deter against possible cyber intrusions 
aiming to disrupt their campaigns.222 In spite of measures implemented by French 
authorities, the candidates contend that cyber actors immediately initiated attacks on 
presidential candidates’ systems in October 2016. The purpose of the attacks focused on 
finding and stealing information to strengthen and guide disinformation campaigns.223 
This information was circulated in the media as well as through social media.224 
Cyberattacks persisted through the winter of 2017, leading to presidential candidate 
Emmanuel Macron’s campaign being plagued with leaked emails and other information 
prior to the election in May 2017.225 Despite the continued Russian interference into 
Emmanuel Macron’s campaign he was elected president.226 
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2. Contextual Analysis 
An essential element of the 2017 French presidential election is the level of 
preparation that France developed and implemented to defend against anticipated undue 
foreign influence. French officials analyzed the lessons learned from the 2016 U.S. 
presidential election to create a plan to mitigate any influence in France’s election.227 The 
lessons learned from the U.S. presidential election provided preemptive strategies which 
the  French authorities utilized  to minimize potential cyber threats to the campaigns by a 
foreign entity. 
Christopher Chivvis represented the RAND Corporation and gave testimony to the 
U.S. House of Representatives on March 22, 2017, in  regard to Russian hybrid warfare, 
and gray zone tactics to influence foreign states.228 Chivvis highlighted Russia’s ability to 
use gray zone tactics through information operations as well as cyber operations in order 
to “ensure that political outcomes in targeted countries serve Russia’s national 
interests.”229 Chivvis predicted that, due to Emmanuel Macron’s stance against Russia and 
his opponents’ pro-Russian stances, that Russia may very well attempt to undermine his 
election campaign.230  
Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer argues that “Moscow considers its actions to be 
defensive” due to the view that Russia is “the victim of an information war waged by the 
West.”231 Vilmer continues, arguing that even though Russian actors are believed to be 
behind this interference, it is important to note that strategically it was an operational failure 
because “the result of the election did not coincide with the aim of the attackers.”232 
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3. Event Timeline 
Emmanuel Macron’s cybersecurity team reported that they began to experience 
phishing attacks as early as December 2016.233 Vilmer reported that the campaign 
experienced email spoofing. This type of attack introduces an email address looks identical 
to a sender’s but in this case was missing one letter, containing documents that would steal 
credentials from campaign staff to gain access to the systems.234 Erik Brattberg and Tim 
Maurer report that in February 2017, Jean-Marc Ayrault, who was the French Foreign 
Minister at the time, told Moscow that Paris would not tolerate any interference in the 
election.235 This statement was made due to the repeated cyberattacks that Macron’s 
campaign was experiencing.  
While Macron’s staff was focused on combating cyber intrusions, they were also 
fighting off a disinformation campaign lead by Russian media. Vilmer reports that from 
January 2017 until the election date, Macron faced media rumors and lies meant to degrade 
him as a candidate.236 He also notes that around January is when Macron began to become 
a front runner in the election cycle. Vilmer highlights RT and Sputnik as the leading media 
outlets publishing false information against Macron and his campaign.237 Sputnik would 
cleverly manipulate information to provide a false idea about Macron in order to discredit 
him, but would report it in a way that allowed the organization to avoid punishment for 
reporting “fake news.”238 On April 27, 2017, the Macron campaign banned Sputnik and 
RT from attending any more of its events due to the disinformation and continued lies the 
two organizations perpetuated.239 
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Trend Micro released a report examining the cyber actions of Pawn Storm or 
APT28 which was one of the hacker groups responsible for the DNC hack in 2016.240 
Within this report is a list of organizations targeted by APT28, and on March 15, 2017, 
Macron’s campaign was a target of a phishing campaign.241 Following this report, 
Macron’s campaign reported that several thousand attempts had been made to hack and 
disrupt the campaign.242 Russia is known to favor pro-Russian candidates such as Marine 
Le Pen, Macron’s opposition for election, and Russia, in 2014, loaned €9.4 million to her 
political party.243 French officials have not directly attributed blame to Russia for the 
APT28 phishing campaigns but they do believe the attacks were in line with Russian 
interests.244 The United States has been more outspoken with the NSA attributing blame 
to Russia for interfering in the French election.245 
Emmanuel Macron’s strategic responses continued to combat the misinformation 
campaign against him routinely until election day on May 7, 2017. Erik Brattberg and Tim 
Mauer reported that on May 5, 2017, the hackers dumped over “9 gigabytes of stolen files 
and 21,000 emails were uploaded to the platform Pastebin.”246 The leak had a mix of real 
and forged email documents meant to discredit Macron.247 French law delineates that no 
campaign communications will be allowed 44 hours before French presidential election 
voting and that the media also cannot comment on the poll during this time.248 This law is 
the reason the hackers, who had gained the materials in March, waited until just before the 
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voting began so as to prevent Macron from refuting any allegations.249 This leak circulated 
on Twitter under “#MacronLeaks” where certain political groups and bot accounts helped 
it spread first in the United States and then internationally, but the French people reported 
a stronger trust of conventional media outlets rather than social media, especially English 
speaking, and therefore the leak struggled to gain traction within France.250   
4. Findings and Implications 
The Macron campaign quickly responded to both media disinformation campaigns 
and cyberattacks and, as a result, was able to minimize potential negative outcomes to the 
election. Macron’s team was transparent about the attacks and raised awareness to the issue 
while working diligently to respond to disinformation in the media.251 Russia ran into 
several issues in its attempts to interfere in the election. Vilmer states that Macron was not 
expected to become a front runner in the election and he ended up winning the presidential 
race even which left the hackers unprepared to prevent him from gaining success.252 He 
continues, stating that, because of this, it left hackers little time to dig up information meant 
to harm Macron’s electability. This led to them forging documents to be released in May 
in a futile effort to hurt Macron’s position.253 Macron’s campaign addressed the leaks 
stating that there were, “numerous false documents intended to sow doubt and 
disinformation.”254  
France took an active role to mitigate any interference in the election, and this made 
it more difficult for Russian actors to carry out a successful operation. France had the 
opportunity to learn from the mistakes made during the U.S. election interference which 
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allowed the French government to prepare differently.255 Russian interference attempted 
a “hack and leak” disinformation campaign to undermine Macron but it was not successful 
because the hackers did not understand the French culture and attempted to spread rumors 
about Macron’s sexuality and private life which is not scandalous to the French.256 NATO 
member states worked together to prevent interference in the election, with the United 
States warning French officials about Russian threat actors attempting to access their 
election infrastructure as well as German officials sharing data information with France.257 
The French government used the ANSSI to maintain the integrity of the election as well as 
for coordination with individual campaigns to alert them of potential security risks and 
measures to mitigate those risks.258 Close cooperation as well as French anticipation of 
interference helped prepare the candidates to defend against Russian influence in the 
election cycle.259 This cooperation demonstrates the importance of NATO states working 
together to defend against Russian threats, and against Russian influence meant to divide 
a state to create a domestic political position favorable to Russia. Additionally, the 
proactive cyber deception plans, such as creating fake documents to delegitimize the 
hackers when they get released, created and implemented by campaign specialists 
demonstrated cyberattacks could be minimized and transparent communications 
strengthened the democratic processes in the presidential election.260 
C. DRAGONFLY CAMPAIGNS 
1. Overview 
Cybersecurity firm Symantec discovered that Dragonfly, also known as Energetic 
Bear, in February 2013 began conducting cyber operations within the energy sector in 
 
255 Vilmer, “The ‘Macron Leaks’ Operation: A Post-Mortem,” 29–30. 
256 Ibid., 29. 
257 “Cyber Command Chief Says U.S. Warned France About Russia-Backed Hackers During 
Election,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, May 9, 2017, https://www.rferl.org/a/us-warned-france-russian-
hacking/28476837.html. 
258 Vilmer, “The ‘Macron Leaks’ Operation: A Post-Mortem,” 31–32. 
259 Conley, “Successfully Countering Russian Electoral Interference.” 
260 Vlmer, “The ‘Macron Leaks’ Operation: A Post-Mortem,” 34. 
51 
several NATO states as well as industrial control systems (ICS) equipment providers.261 
This operation continued into 2014, which is when Symantec discovered the cyber 
intrusions and published the initial report. Symantec states that during this operation, 
Dragonfly “managed to compromise a number of strategically important organizations for 
spying purposes.”262 In December 2015, “Dragonfly 2.0” began using similar tactics as 
seen in the first Dragonfly operation.263 However, this time the group focused on learning 
and gaining control of systems, for  reconnaissance purposes, to disrupt or sabotage the 
energy sector if necessary.264 This cyber activity, within the critical infrastructure of the 
energy sector, continued into 2017, specifically targeting a small group of NATO members 
and partner states.265 On March 15, 2018, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency (CISA) released an alert attributing blame on Russian government cyber actors for 
hacking into the energy sector networks of the United States as a part of the Dragonfly 2.0 
campaign.266 
2. Contextual Analysis 
Disruption of the energy sector could be classified as an imminent threat to reduce 
NATO’s resiliency and civil preparedness and potentially hinder the Alliance’s response 
in a crisis. Reliance and technology depend heavily on power provided from the energy 
sector. NATO resiliency is crucial for the Alliance and partner states for “strengthening the 
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Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture.”267 NATO’s ability to swiftly respond to a 
crisis hinges on individual states’ ability to be able to defend against or mitigate the effects 
of a cyberattack against critical infrastructure. Jens Stoltenberg, the Secretary General of 
NATO stated: “A serious cyberattack could trigger Article 5, where an attack against one 
ally is treated as an attack against all.”268 NATO’s stance on cyberattacks demonstrates 
the importance of understanding the effect a large scale attack against a state’s critical 
infrastructure has on the Alliance.  
3. Event Timeline 
Symantec reports that the Dragonfly operation began in February 2013 via a spear 
phishing campaign that targeted senior employees within energy sector companies.269 
Symantec continues, stating that Dragonfly targeted seven different organizations from 
February to June 2013 with this spear phishing campaign. Symantec states that Spain, U.S., 
France, Italy, Germany, Turkey, Poland, Romania, Greece, and Serbia, ordered from most 
malicious activities to least, were the countries with active malicious infections, meaning 
they were the most likely targets of the campaign.270 Dragonfly managed to infect other 
systems through compromising three ICS equipment providers.271 This compromise 
allowed Dragonfly to insert malware into software packages that were available for 
download directly from these ICS providers’ websites for customers.  
Cybersecurity experts believe that Dragonfly was “interested in both learning how 
energy facilities operate and also gaining access to operational systems themselves.”272 
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Symantec’s report further endorses this view by gathering data on targeted companies from 
September 2013 until June 2014.273 This data indicates that “fifty percent of identified 
targets were energy industry related and thirty percent were energy control system,” with 
a shift to prioritizing targeting energy control systems in March 2014. When Dragonfly 
was discovered, experts did not know whom to attribute blame to; however, upon 
examining the time stamps associated to the hacker’s malware, it was discovered that they 
worked Monday-Friday from 9am to 6pm in the UTC +4 time zone.274 During the dates 
that the Dragonfly operation took place, Moscow was in the UTC +4 time zone before it 
permanently switched to UTC +3 in October 2014.275 
Dragonfly focused on gathering data and intelligence about how these energy 
companies operated in order to potentially plan for future attacks. Dragonfly reportedly 
refrained from operations again until the Dragonfly 2.0 campaign, which emerged in 
December 2015 and targeted the energy sectors within Turkey, the United States, and 
Switzerland.276 Dragonfly 2.0 used phishing emails, similar to the first operation, from 
December 2015 into 2017, targeting energy sectors. Rebecca Smith reports that Jonathan 
Homer, chief of ICS analysis for DHS, explained that the hackers exploited vendors to gain 
access into utility networks.277 Homer stated that the hackers studied network 
configuration, equipment use and control, and became familiar with facility operations in 
order to cause disruptions if necessary. He noted that the goal of these hackers was “to 
disguise themselves as ‘the people who touch these systems on a daily basis’” in order to 
avoid detection.278 Experts at Symantec concur with this belief and conclude that “the 
Dragonfly 2.0 campaigns show how the attackers may be entering into a new phase, with 
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recent campaigns potentially providing them with access to operational systems, access 
that could be used for more disruptive purposes in future.”279 
In March 2018, the United States formally blamed Russia for what DHS and FBI 
called, a “multi-stage intrusion campaign” targeting ICS and critical energy sectors.280 In 
the JAR published after the 2016 U.S. presidential election Dragonfly and Energetic Bear 
were both listed as “Reported Russian Military and Civilian Intelligence Services.”281 
Experts surmised that Dragonfly 2.0 may have had a destructive intent but they affirm the 
hackers did not disrupt any energy operations.282 Homer stated, “‘they [Dragonfly 2.0] got 
to the point where they could have thrown switches’ and disrupted power flows.”283  
4. Findings and Implications 
This case affirms that Russian cyber actors accessed systems, conducted 
reconnaissance, and demonstrated the potential to disrupt the flow of energy and electrical 
power while avoiding detection for an extended period of time. Private sector security 
companies were the first to report on the cyber intrusions into the victim organizations 
systems. The scope and technical ability of Russian cyber hackers to target weaker links as 
well as software vendors in order to gain further access into victims’ systems displays the 
high level of skill of the Dragonfly threat actors. In this case, the hackers did not disrupt 
the flow of power, but they did have the ability to disrupt the power flows, thus potentially 
causing chaos within the target states. These hackers are versatile and well-sourced, a 
scenario which affirms NATO’s shift toward better cyber defense and deterrence measures. 
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Additionally, the case reveals the direct correlation to the increase in technological 
capabilities of NATO states and subsequent increase in potential technological weaknesses 
that can be exploited by an adversary in cyberspace. With this in mind, NATO, since 2016, 
has steadily increased its focus and deterrence capabilities in the cyber domain. In July 
2016, NATO published the “Cyber Defence Pledge” which prioritized enhancing national 
infrastructures and networks to create a strong and resilient cyber system.284 The Brussels 
Summit in 2018 reaffirmed this pledge, stating the continual efforts to increase cyber 
resilience are crucial to increasing the strength of the Alliance and member states.285 Cyber 
deterrence is a fundamental shift within NATO to include the cyber domain into the 
collective defense domain. The full effects of a cyberattack against energy and critical 
infrastructure operations have not been demonstrated against a NATO member but experts 
fear it could have detrimental consequences if NATO is not prepared to defend against 
such an attack.286 
D. NOTPETYA 
1. Overview 
On June 27, 2017, state cyber actors targeted systems within Ukraine in order to 
destroy critical infrastructure areas with the NotPetya cyberattack.287 Banks, airports, and 
energy firms were central in the conflict of the Ukrainian target industries.288 The 
cyberattack used malware that had a rapid and destructive impact while spreading from 
system to system indiscriminately.289 Less than eight months after the attack, blame was 
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attributed to the Russian military for the devastating and most costly cyberattack in 
history.290 NotPetya spread rapidly within Ukraine and then indiscriminately outside of 
Ukraine, initially targeting companies that held an office inside Ukrainian borders.291 This 
attack slowed the global operations of companies inside and outside of Ukraine for months 
and placed increased strain and concern on critical infrastructure within NATO states while 
creating an estimated $10 billion in damage.292 
2. Contextual Analysis 
NotPetya is an unprecedented case with global implications due to its relevance to 
the critical infrastructure security of NATO states. While NotPetya was a result of the 
undeclared war between Ukraine and Russia, neither of which is a NATO member, the 
attack did widespread collateral damage to NATO member states.293 This case study 
reveals the major threat that cyberattacks pose to a globalized and interconnected world. 
The effects of the attack were evidenced for months after the initial strike and reinforced 
to NATO the need for increased strength and resiliency in the face of a cyberattack. Russian 
cyber actors have been undertaking critical infrastructure cyberattacks in Ukraine for years, 
and the processes used by the hackers are becoming more efficient and stealthy.294 Experts 
contend that Russia’s expansion of its grand strategy included focused and purposeful 
cyberattacks on Ukraine to implement enhanced tactics and test retaliation strategies.295  
3. Event Timeline 
Cisco’s Talos intelligence group investigated the Ukrainian attack and reported that 
the cyber actor behind NotPetya was able to gain access to victim companies’ servers 
through a “watering hole” attack using M.E.Doc, which is identified as a Ukrainian tax 
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accounting software provider.296 Talos revealed that the attack introduced malware with 
the intent to destroy systems and the malware was camouflaged to look like a ransomware 
attack. Talos uncovered that over 2,000 companies were affected in Ukraine. The specific 
timeline establishes that the attackers began uploading a backdoor containing the malware 
to the victims on April 14, 2017, via M.E.Doc software updates. The upload was made 
possible due to the early access into M.E.Doc’s software and the software updates were 
released with backdoors built into the code again on May 15 and June 22; this lead up to 
the June 27 attack.  
The cyber actors gained access to the target systems months before they unleashed 
the malware on them which was one day before Ukraine’s constitution day, June 28.297 
Ukrainian officials believed the attack was “more likely state-sponsored” due to the timing 
coupled with the ongoing conflict with Russia.298 Within hours of NotPetya’s release, the 
malware spread all around Ukraine and then struck global companies such as Maersk, 
Merck Pharmaceuticals, and TNT Express (which had just been bought by FedEx).299 The 
malware was able to spread to these companies because they each had at least one computer 
with M.E.Doc software on it, and this enabled the malware to then target each company’s 
systems in a rapid and destructive manner.300 The damage incurred by NotPetya was an 
estimated cost of $10 billion, making it the most costly cyberattack in history.301 
Andy Greenberg reported on the effects different companies and government 
entities experienced as a result of the NotPetya malware attack.302 He notes that at least 
four hospitals, two airports, six power companies, 22 banks, credit card systems, 
transportation systems, and almost every federal agency were crucially impacted by the 
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attack. Greenberg quotes Volodymyr Omelyan, Ukrainian minister of infrastructure, who 
said “the government was dead” and that NotPetya “was a massive bombing of all our 
systems.”303 This was not the first time that the Ukrainian power grid had been 
compromised by hackers; Greenberg reports that Sandworm, a Russian GRU cyber 
hacking group, had done so in 2015 and 2016.304 For companies based outside of Ukraine 
this sentiment echoed true as well. Greenberg reports that Denmark-based Maersk shipping 
had 17 shipping terminals located all around the world and ceased operations for days due 
to the collapse of its systems.305 Further, he states that globalized transportation 
experienced a significant loss, noting how Maersk had to rebuild 4,000 servers and 45,000 
computers and lost $300 million due to the attack. NotPetya resulted in Merck 
pharmaceutical operational closures, specific to vaccine manufacturing, for several months 
after the attack.306 European package shipping company TNT Express did not fully 
recover from the cyberattack until September 2017.307 This attack required the 
implementation of an antiquated package system to organize orders and deliveries via pen 
and paper. The loss of online systems to manage distribution resulted in lost or delayed 
packages being sent all around Europe.308  
Greenberg reports that one week after NotPetya Ukrainian officials seized all of 
M.E.Doc’s servers in order to prevent any further malware spread and to allow experts to 
examine them in order to analyze how the hackers carried out the attack.309 On June 30, 
2017, NATO’s Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence (CCDCOE) released a 
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statement stating that NotPetya “can most likely be attributed to a state actor.”310 In 
February 2018, the United States officially blamed Russia for NotPetya stating, “it was part 
of the Kremlin’s ongoing effort to destabilize Ukraine and demonstrates ever more clearly 
Russia’s involvement in the ongoing conflict. This was also a reckless and indiscriminate 
cyberattack that will be met with international consequences.”311  
4. Findings and Implications 
The NotPetya cyberattack had a cascading global effect. The malware impacted 
healthcare, logistics, energy, banking, and several other critical infrastructure sectors. This 
attack displayed the drawback of globalized and interconnected systems. The attack was 
meant to target Ukraine but rapidly spread, affecting 65 countries, including several NATO 
member states as well as partner states.312 NotPetya allowed Russia to implement new 
cyber tactics against a real-time adversary without real repercussions due to its ongoing 
conflict with Ukraine. Although all impacted states were not identified as direct targets, the 
affected states are considered “collateral damage” which establishes the expansive reach 
of a targeted cyberattack. NotPetya was reckless and displayed a state actor that disregards 
the established norms of cyberspace.  
NotPetya disrupted critical infrastructure operations such as healthcare, logistics, 
and energy within NATO states. The relative ease in which the malware infected so many 
different sectors revealed a weakness within state’s cybersecurity. NATO Allies should 
require organizations and companies to adequately prepare security and defense measures 
to prevent damage. Russia’s attack demonstrated the ability to shut down technology 
through cyber channels; NATO has a responsibility to prepare a collective defense to deter 
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malware attacks from taking place within the borders of a member state.313 NATO released 
statements concerning an Article 5 retaliation to a cyberattack but has yet to determine 
where the threshold for such an attack exists.314 Russia has effectively carried out critical 
infrastructure cyber operations against Ukraine with relative ease. This case affirms that 
cyberattacks, within Russia’s grand strategy, are purposeful to test, refine, and implement 
global attacks. Central to this finding is the need for NATO leaders to collaborate to 
identify potential threats, analyze previous malware, develop countermeasures for future 
attacks and establish training protocols for cyber specialists. Communication is essential 
to the ability of the Alliance to limit malware attacks and refine cyber systems to minimize 
attacks and maximize effectiveness. 
E. CONCLUSION 
Russian cyber operations, within these four case studies, demonstrate the evolution 
and scope of Russian grand strategy in the cyber domain. These studies affirmed Russia 
utilized information gained from previous operations and applied evolving tactics during 
subsequent operations. The Dragonfly operations demonstrated the ability for Russia to 
gather intelligence to develop an understanding for how the energy sector operates. 
Dragonfly presented a proof of concept, that critical infrastructure can be hacked via a 
cyber operation. The NotPetya cyberattack against Ukraine demonstrated the scope and 
damage that can be done to critical infrastructure via cyberattacks. NotPetya created $10 
billion in damage due to a cyberattack targeting one state.315 The potential scope of 
damage caused by a cyberattack is not fully understood, but NotPetya demonstrated that 
there is a possibility for a stronger and more damaging cyberattack in the future.  
In order to recognize the power of the gray zone, it is valuable to note the lessons 
that Russia learned through each case in regard to grand strategic goals. Influence 
operations have a high potential to create instability within a target state when executed 
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effectively. Russia’s attempts to influence American and French election outcomes were 
not as effective due to culture and language barriers.316 Russia had the opportunity to carry 
out disinformation operations within two NATO members. While neither of these 
operations swayed the outcome of the election, Russia can build upon the failures in these 
cases to create more effective influence campaigns.  
Russia’s multiple election interference operations demonstrate the ability to 
destabilize specific NATO members in order to affect the Alliance as a whole. 
Destabilizing strong NATO members, domestically, has the ability to display a weakened 
NATO Alliance to the world. If member states are distracted by handling divisive domestic 
issues, as generated by election interference, the Alliance is left in a weakened position. 
The Alliance requires a cohesive response from all members and a unified posture is 
essential to display strength. If NATO appears weak to the international community, it 
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IV. COUNTERING RUSSIAN CYBER OPERATIONS    
A. RESEARCH SUMMARY  
The thesis evaluated four case studies to examine Russia’s grand strategy and 
consequent impacts on the NATO Alliance. Specifically, the research investigated the 
question: what is the intersection between Russian cyber operations and grand strategy to 
weaken the NATO Alliance? The research conducted found that Russia’s cyber operations 
within information operations and against critical infrastructure domains provided 
evidence of Russian grand strategy objectives. The findings of this thesis contend that 
analysis of the functional, fiscal, and political effects of cyber operations are essential to 
policy recommendations to minimize Russia’s grand strategy outcomes. Russian grand 
strategy demonstrates strategic and long-term goals to weaken the Alliance. In contrast to 
date, the Alliance has, since 2016, begun to recognize cyber as a military domain and 
develop strategic plans to recognize and combat cyberattacks.317 Additionally, the case 
studies require policy makers to compare and contrast defensive and offensive warfare 
tactics. The studies indicate that Russia did not seek to respond to NATO expansion 
through defensive actions but rather developed their grand strategy as an offensive warfare 
tactic to destabilize NATO and establish Russia as a formidable actor in cyber operations. 
As this thesis established in Chapter II, Russia has demonstrated the ability to 
effectively use cyber operations to achieve grand strategy goals through political 
destabilization and critical infrastructure attacks in order to weaken a response from the 
NATO Alliance or member states. Russian operations to interfere in multiple presidential 
elections were carried out to destabilize NATO states and strengthen Russian influence. 
Attempts to get state leaders elected that Russia viewed as beneficial had the predetermined 
purpose to divide the NATO Alliance. Wirtz argues that, “Russia, more than any other 
nascent actor on the cyber stage, seems to have devised a way to integrate cyber warfare 
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into a grand strategy capable of achieving political objectives.”318 Geir Karlsen contends 
that Russia’s focus on creating instability within adversary states plays into its long term 
plan of weakening adversaries from within in order to project its own strength and rise to 
global power.319 Russia has effectively operated within the gray zone by using asymmetric 
cyber operations that remained below the threshold for conflict. Russian strategy focuses 
on creating instability in order to weaken a state from within. Russian cyber operations 
implemented an array of cyber actors such as bots, trolls, and hacktivists in coordination 
with social media and news organizations to disseminate disinformation to large 
populations within targeted states. These interference operations are short-term focused 
with more immediate effects; however, they also work toward Russia’s long-term goal of 
disrupting the NATO Alliance in order to weaken it. 
The scope of NotPetya displayed the capabilities that cyberattacks on critical 
infrastructure have and the widespread damage that can be inflicted with such an operation. 
After NotPetya, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said, “The next war will begin 
with a massive cyberattack to destroy military capacity ... and paralyze basic infrastructure 
such as the electric networks.”320 The possibilities for cyber are still not fully developed 
and Russia is continually adapting its cyber operations, with experts Maness, Jensen, and 
Valeriano stating that, “Russia still has not unleashed the full potential of cyber operations 
against critical energy targets.”321 NotPetya demonstrated the detrimental effects that 
cyberattacks on critical infrastructure create, effects such as widespread power outages, 
global logistical delays, healthcare shortages, and electronic banking collapses. Dragonfly 
also demonstrated the ability to infiltrate a power grid in order to gather intelligence about 
how it operates with the possibility to later carry out an attack that disables or destroys the 
energy and power sector. If cyber operations have not been utilized to their fullest potential 
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as of yet, then understanding previous operational capabilities is important for NATO when 
preparing for future operations.  
Russia has the capability through cyber operations to destabilize NATO by creating 
weaknesses within Alliance members that threatens state security and stability. Arguably, 
one of the most important drivers of the NATO Alliance is Article 5 and collective 
defense.322 Collective defense requires a cohesive response from every member of the 
Alliance, a response which can be hampered due to internal domestic issues or through 
critical infrastructure failures. Cyber operations have the potential to destabilize a region 
politically as well as physically, and this could leave NATO members distracted, unable to 
quickly and effectively respond to an impending threat from Russia.  
B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Evaluate NATO Attribution for Cyber Operations  
Russia’s apparent interest in destabilizing NATO at the strategic level likely entails 
degrading relationships not only within the Alliance but also within individual states of the 
Alliance. Karlsen notes that promoting division within the Alliance is what Western 
security institutions believe to be a key goal of Russian cyber operations.323  Due to this, 
cyber attribution is a critical aspect of responding to a cyber operation and NATO needs to 
denounce and openly attribute blame to the provocateur of a cyber operation. Open 
attribution places the aggressor state in the international spotlight which works to deter that 
state from future operations. It is the recommendation of this author that NATO adjust its 
posture and demonstrate a willingness to denounce any cyber activity that experts believe 
is from Russia. The case studies demonstrate the significant challenge to investigate and 
accurately attribute responsibility for cyberattacks. It is the recommendation for policy 
makers to conduct ongoing research and analyze findings to guide countermeasures and 
training.  
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Currently, not all NATO states are as willing as the United States to attribute blame 
for a cyber operation. The French presidential election provided documented evidence that 
resulted in the U.S. government’s willingness to blame Russia; in contrast, the French 
government refrained from directly attributing the cyber operation to Russia.324 In order 
to strengthen the Alliance and its position as a leading institution, NATO leaders are 
encouraged to evaluate future events and require collective recognition and responses to 
Russian cyber operations. A collective response and agreement from all of the NATO 
states, in response to a cyber operation against one member, displays a unity within the 
Alliance that further strengthens NATO. A unified NATO response demonstrates a strong 
Alliance that will minimize Russia’s ability to create division within the states and an 
Alliance that is prepared to respond to any threat. 
2. Determine NATO Threshold for Response and Retaliation 
The NATO Alliance is centered around the Article 5 commitment to collective 
defense from a conventional attack. In 2019, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg 
affirmed that “a serious cyberattack could trigger Article 5.”325 This is an evolving stance 
on cyberattacks that the Alliance did not demonstrate during previous incidents of Russian 
cyber operations analyzed in this thesis. Russia was able to carry out those cyber operations 
with minimal repercussions due to the issue of attribution. Following a systematic 
intelligence gathering and review, the NATO Alliance will be better equipped to determine 
the threshold for an Article 5 response. Creating and implementing NATO guidelines and 
strategies to evaluate, identify, and respond to cyber threats, allows NATO the ability to 
compare and contrast previous attacks against present threats to determine thresholds in 
each case. NATO should then publish a statement that all NATO member states have come 
together to determine the threshold for a cyber Article 5 response and are committed as an 
Alliance to respond to such an attack. Determining a threshold and then reaffirming 
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commitment to retaliating to an Article 5 attack extends the longstanding strength of the 
Alliance, which in turns solidifies its legitimacy as an institution. 
Not every cyber threat or cyberattack will warrant an Article 5 response, but in 
order to display the strength and commitment of the Alliance, a measured response is a 
critical tactic from the Alliance. For Russian attempts to interfere with the domestic 
electoral proceedings of a NATO member the Alliance could invoke Article 4 which states 
“The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”326 This 
allows the Alliance to come up with a unified response to a threat to a member state. Cyber 
operations involving influence operations or critical infrastructure threats warrant 
individual evaluation. NATO needs to develop guidelines for responding to cyber 
operations against member states that handle operations on a case by case basis. Not all 
operations are undertaken for the same purpose and therefore require strategic responses. 
NATO has exercised responses to issues below the threshold of Article 5 for conventional 
matters; implementing guidelines and strategies in response to a cyber threat below this 
threshold would strengthen the legitimacy of NATO in cyber while deterring future 
adversaries. 
3. Strengthen Intelligence Sharing Cooperation 
Intelligence sharing is a key element of any alliance, and NATO member states are 
obligated to continually improve and strengthen intelligence cooperation. Greater 
cooperation between NATO states strengthens the Alliance as well as prepares states to 
defend against cyber operations while creating a deterrent. Greater intelligence cooperation 
will lead to further strengthening NATO resiliency and defense as specified in Article 3 
which states “In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, 
separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will 
maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.”327 
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Cooperation and collaboration between partner states makes it more difficult for an 
adversary, such as Russia, to carry out a cyber operation against a NATO state. In the 
French presidential election, the U.S. government was able to communicate with the 
French government to alert it to Russian cyber activity meant to interfere in the election.328 
Continual intelligence sharing between NATO members enables them to design and 
implement cyber defenses resulting in a stronger Alliance. 
Cooperation between NATO states is crucial to strengthening cyber defenses; 
additionally, it is critical that policies identify cooperation between state and private 
entities. Private cybersecurity firms as well as areas of critical infrastructure of a state need 
to work closely with government agencies to create a stronger defense network. Dragonfly 
was first discovered by cybersecurity firm Symantec, a discovery which led to governments 
being able to track the cyber operation back to the Russian government.329 Private entities 
may discover suspicious cyber activity and through close cooperation with government 
agencies could deter, defend, and even attribute cyber operations before an attack or 
effective information operation could take place. Intelligence sharing and cooperation 
within a NATO state can then be taken to the Alliance to be shared with other states and 
private entities. Close collaboration and intelligence sharing benefits the Alliance and 
further strengthens its commitment to the defense of NATO states. 
4. Develop NATO Cybersecurity Tactics, Training, and Procedures 
NATO conducts exercises to strengthen military cooperation and demonstrate the 
capabilities of the Alliance as a deterrent to adversaries. The findings of the case studies 
highlight the lack of essential security procedures and training to minimize future attacks 
and the need for NATO leaders to rapidly advance tactics and training to respond 
appropriately. In contrast, Russia identified and executed a long-term strategy to weaken 
the Alliance. Recognizing the changing battlefield, it is imperative to develop cyber 
training tactics and procedures that increase member states’ abilities to collaborate in order 
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to strengthen, deter, and defeat a cyber adversary. The evolving battlefield and consequent 
adjustments to policy and procedures will demonstrate the adaptability of the Alliance to 
recognize imminent threats to the Alliance. Cyber training allows the Alliance to identify 
strengths and weaknesses of Allied members while increasing the effectiveness of the 
Alliance to operate in the cyber domain. Training at the Alliance level can then be taken to 
the individual state level to increase the state’s cyber abilities. This training invites the 
Alliance members to observe and adjust effective warfare tactics in the cyber domain while 
simultaneously enhancing strategies with Allies. Attention to continual training ensures the 
NATO Alliance is responding to potential and imminent threats from Russia and other 
adversary states. 
Cyberattacks have the potential to disrupt critical infrastructure but they also have 
the potential to be a detriment financially to the global economy. NotPetya accrued over 
$10 billion in damages and it started as a cyberattack against one state, Ukraine, that then 
had a global impact affecting a multitude of industries.330 The fiscal damage inflicted by 
cyberattacks demonstrates the reality of an evolving battlefield and immediate 
responsibility for states to take a proactive stance on identifying cyberattacks and targets. 
Collaboration with the private sector can strengthen an organization and minimize physical 
as well as fiscal damage due to a cyberattack. Proactive and updated systems strengthen a 
state’s response capabilities but also works to deter a cyber operation through hardening 
the intended targets systems. Creating guidelines and procedures for training and testing 
systems allows Allied states to prepare for a cyberattack while strengthening its own cyber 
position, thus further deterring an adversary.  
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